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UNCHARITABLE HOSPITALS: WHY THE 
IRS NEEDS INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS 
TO REGULATE TAX-EXEMPT HOSPITALS 
Abstract: Tax-exempt hospitals receive millions of dollars worth of tax breaks 
each year for the purpose of providing care to their communities. Despite these 
tax breaks, however, there is little evidence to suggest that such breaks signifi-
cantly benefit the hospitals’ communities. When a hospital no longer meets the 
federal standard for tax exemption, the Internal Revenue Service currently has 
two enforcement options: (1) do nothing; or (2) move to revoke the hospital’s 
tax-exempt status. Revocation, however, is a harsh option that is not appropriate 
for every circumstance where a hospital fails to meet one or more of the require-
ments for exemption. As a result, many tax-exempt hospitals fail to meet the ex-
emption standard but do not have their tax-exempt status revoked. Commentators 
have recommended modifying the qualifying standard for hospital tax exemption 
to address this growing problem. This Note takes a different position and argues 
that Congress should give the IRS statutory authority to impose excise tax inter-
mediate sanctions on underperforming hospitals as an enforcement tool short of 
revocation. Intermediate sanctions would provide the IRS with the flexibility to 
regulate the boundaries of a hospital’s tax-exempt status while ensuring that 
communities continue to benefit from the services of tax-exempt hospitals. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1990s, Sondra Henderson was unemployed and struggling to 
make ends meet after a divorce destroyed her family business.1 After seeking 
treatment for her heart condition at Yale-New Haven Hospital, Ms. Hender-
son—while uninsured—was sued by the hospital in its effort to recover the 
$4000 costs of her treatment.2 In addition, the hospital placed a lien on Ms. 
Henderson’s home without her knowledge and initiated foreclosure proceed-
ings to satisfy the debt.3 Ms. Henderson appealed to relatives to help her pay a 
lump sum to settle the debt—the $4000 along with growing interest, foreclo-
sure expenses, and attorney’s fees.4 The day after Yale-New Haven’s attorneys 
received Ms. Henderson’s $10,313 payment, they nailed a foreclosure sign to a 
                                                                                                                           
 1 CONN. CTR. FOR A NEW ECON., UNCHARITABLE CARE: YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL’S CHAR-
ITY CARE AND COLLECTIONS PRACTICES 6 (2003), available at http://www.ctneweconomy.org/wp-
content/uploads/uncharitable_care.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F855-Z42M. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. at 7. 
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tree in front of her house, claiming that she was still liable for $875 in attor-
ney’s fees.5 Ultimately, Ms. Henderson paid her own attorney $1000 to get the 
hospital to drop its additional claim.6 
It is clear from this episode that Yale-New Haven Hospital acted in viola-
tion of its mission as a tax-exempt “charitable” organization.7 Under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, hospitals are exempted from federal 
taxation as “charitable” organizations if they meet the “community benefits” 
standard.8 Under this standard, hospitals must promote health in a manner that 
benefits the whole community and are prohibited from acting in ways that 
solely benefit the organization economically.9 The IRS considers multiple fac-
tors—with no one factor being determinative—to determine whether a hospital 
merits tax-exempt status.10 
 Despite the existence of the community benefits standard, tax-exempt 
hospitals routinely act in ways that stretch or violate the standard and the IRS 
has no meaningful way to redress this problem.11 When a hospital does not 
meet the standard, the IRS currently has two enforcement options: (1) do noth-
ing; or (2) move to revoke the hospital’s tax-exempt status.12 Revocation, 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 1; see I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (providing the tax exemption for certain charitable organ-
izations). Yale-New Haven Hospital is Connecticut’s largest, most prestigious hospital. CONN. CTR. 
FOR A NEW ECON., supra note 1, at 1. Its state and federal tax exemptions are estimated to be worth 
millions of dollars. Id. 
 8 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Bobby A. Courtney, Hospital Tax-Exemption and the Community Benefit 
Standard: Considerations for Future Policymaking, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 365, 368 (2011); Alice A. 
Noble et al., Charitable Hospital Accountability: A Review and Analysis of Legal and Policy Initia-
tives, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 116, 118 (1998); Gail Rebecca Floyd, Nonprofit Joint Ventures and 
Community Benefit: A New Approach, FED. LAW., June 2001, at 23, 23–24; see Jessica Berg, Putting 
the Community Benefit Back into the “Community Benefit” Standard, 44 GA. L. REV. 375, 380 
(2010); Jack E. Karns, Justifying the Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption in a Competitive Market En-
vironment, 13 WIDENER L.J. 383, 402 (2004). For a discussion of the community benefits standard, 
see infra notes 44–52 and accompanying text. 
 9 See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118; Charles B. Gilbert, Health-Care Reform and the Non-
profit Hospital: Is Tax-Exempt Status Still Warranted?, 26 URB. LAW. 143, 150 (1994); Karns, supra 
note 8, at 404–05. 
 10 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118; see Amanda W. Thai, Note, Is Senator Grassley Our Sav-
ior?: The Crusade Against “Charitable” Hospitals Attacking Patients for Unpaid Bills, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 761, 768 (2011). 
 11 See I.R.C. § 501; Mary Crossley, Tax-Exempt Hospitals, Community Health Needs and Ad-
dressing Disparities, 55 HOW. L.J. 687, 691 (2012); George A. Nation, III, Non-Profit Charitable 
Tax-Exempt Hospitals—Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: To Increase Fairness and Enhance Competition 
in Health Care All Hospitals Should Be For-Profit and Taxable, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 141, 170 (2010); 
Thai, supra note 10, at 770–71. 
 12 See Berg, supra note 8, at 382; David M. Studdert et al., Regulatory and Judicial Oversight of 
Nonprofit Hospitals, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 625, 626 (2007); David A. Levitt, Excess Benefit Trans-
actions Under Section 4958 and Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status, PRAC. TAX LAW., Spring 2009, at 
13, 14. 
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however, is a harsh option that is not appropriate for every circumstance.13 As 
a result, many tax-exempt hospitals fail to meet the exemption standard but are 
not subjected to revocation.14  
 To remedy this problem, the IRS needs authority to impose intermediate 
sanctions on hospitals.15 Intermediate sanctions would allow the IRS to tailor 
penalties for a specific violation.16 Moreover, where the community benefits 
standard is very flexible, the IRS, too, needs flexible tools to enforce it.17 
 This Note explains why the IRS has been unsuccessful in regulating tax-
exempt hospitals’ activities and proposes a solution that would ensure that citi-
zens and communities benefit from their services.18 Part I begins by examining 
the legal framework that hospitals must follow to obtain federal tax-exempt 
status.19 Part I also examines the IRS’s limited options in enforcing the com-
munity benefits standard.20 Part II then discusses how the IRS’s lack of en-
forcement options allows hospitals to act uncharitably.21 Finally, Part III argues 
that Congress should enact legislation that enables the IRS to use intermediate 
sanctions to bring the actual behavior of tax-exempt hospitals in line with the 
expected behavior of a “charitable” organization.22 
I. REQUIREMENTS FOR HOSPITAL TAX EXEMPTION AND THE IRS’S  
RELATED ENFORCEMENT POWERS 
In 1954, Congress enacted Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code, cre-
ating the modern statutory tax exemption for selected organizations, including 
nonprofit hospitals.23 Specifically, Section 501(a) creates a federal income tax 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Berg, supra note 8, at 382 (discussing how the IRS has only sought revocation in egregious 
circumstances); Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626 (noting the severity of revocation); Levitt, supra 
note 12, at 14 (highlighting that revocation may not be appropriate for every circumstance). 
 14 See Berg, supra note 8, at 382; Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626; Levitt, supra note 12, at 
14. 
 15 See The Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 
109th Cong. 9 (2005) [hereinafter Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector] (statement of Mark Everson, Com-
missioner, Internal Revenue Service) (calling for increased enforcement flexibility to better regulate 
hospitals through intermediate sanctions); Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626 (discussing the use of 
intermediate sanctions for related violations). 
16 See Berg, supra note 8, at 382; Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626; Levitt, supra note 12, at 
14. 
 17 See Berg, supra note 8, at 382; Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626; Levitt, supra note 12, at 
14. 
 18 See infra notes 23–243 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 23–72 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 73–92 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 93–161 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 162–243 and accompanying text. 
 23 See I.R.C. § 501 (2012); John D. Colombo, The Role of Tax Exemption in a Competitive Health 
Care Market, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 623, 623–24 (2006); Karns, supra note 8, at 392. 
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exemption for certain types of organizations described in Section 501(c)(3).24 
“Charitable” organizations qualify for the exemption.25 To qualify as charitable, 
the organization must meet an organizational test and an operational test.26 An 
organization satisfies the organizational test if its articles of organization limit its 
purpose to one or more of the exempt purposes listed in Section 501(c)(3) and 
restrict the organization from engaging in more than an insubstantial amount of 
non-exempt activities.27 An organization satisfies the operational test if it en-
gages primarily in activities that accomplish one or more of the exempt pur-
poses listed in Section 501(c)(3) and its net earnings do not inure to the benefit 
of private individuals or shareholders.28 If a tax-exempt organization’s net 
earnings inure to the benefit of private individuals or shareholders—thereby 
failing both the organizational and operational tests—the IRS can impose in-
termediate sanctions before moving to revoke an organization’s status.29 If 
these tests are satisfied, however, a hospital is considered a charitable organi-
zation and receives an exemption.30 
Congress and the IRS frequently expound upon the precise conditions that 
hospitals must meet to be considered charitable under Section 501(c)(3).31 For 
example, over the years, the IRS has issued guidance about its expectations for 
tax-exempt hospital behavior.32 In addition, in 2010, Congress amended the 
Internal Revenue Code to add several new actions that hospitals must perform 
                                                                                                                           
 24 I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3). Although this Note focuses on organizations that have obtained or seek 
to obtain tax-exempt status by operation of § 501(c)(3), the § 501(a) exemption is not limited to such 
organizations. See id. 
 25 Id. § 501(c). 
 26 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a) (as amended in 2008); Floyd, supra note 8, at 24. Eligible organ-
izations also must refrain from lobbying for legislation and participating in political campaigns. I.R.C. 
§ 501(c). 
 27 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (as amended in 2008); see Floyd, supra note 8, at 24. In addition 
to charitable organizations, religious, scientific, literary, and educational organizations are also con-
sidered to be organized for exempt purposes. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 28 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (as amended in 2008); see Floyd, supra note 8, at 24. 
 29 See I.R.C. § 501 (2012); id. § 4958 (2012); Berg, supra note 8, at 382. For a detailed discussion 
on intermediate sanctions, see infra notes 129–161 and accompanying text. 
 30 See I.R.C. § 501; Colombo, supra note 23, at 623–24; Michele R. Goodman, Note, Putting the 
Community Back in Community Benefit: Proposed State Tax Exemption Standard for Nonprofit Hos-
pitals, 84 IND. L.J. 713, 717 (2009). 
 31 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007, 124 Stat. 
119, 128 (2010), amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (adding new requirements for hospitals to be treated as charitable organi-
zations); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2008) (revising the test for hospitals to be treated 
as charitable organizations); Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94–95 (clarifying the types of hospitals 
that are eligible for treatment as charitable organizations). 
 32 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94–95; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117–18; Rev. 
Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202–03. 
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in order to qualify for tax-exempt status.33 This ad-hoc collection of require-
ments is called the community benefits standard,34 and hospitals are required 
to satisfy this standard in addition to the other statutory requirements of Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) in order to obtain tax-exempt status.35 
The governments tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals is grounded in 
two primary justifications.36 First, under government subsidy theory, the tax 
exemption is justified because it relieves the government from the obligation 
of performing necessary functions for society that it would otherwise have to 
perform; this relief counterbalances the government’s lost tax revenues.37 Sec-
ond, the exemption is often justified as necessary to safeguard against depro-
fessionalized medicine, which prioritizes turning a profit over treating pa-
tients.38 This makes sense because, where for-profit hospitals have a primary 
goal of profit maximization, tax exemption can promote the incidence of non-
profit hospitals which, alternatively, are exclusively committed to providing 
quality health care rather than seeking profits.39 Conversely, tax-exempt hospi-
tals purport to serve the broad needs of society as opposed to the economic 
interests of their organizers.40 
This Part explains the standard and enforcement mechanisms for hospital 
tax exemption.41 Section A examines the community benefits standard and the 
new requirements that emerged from the 2010 amendment to the I.R.C.42 
Then, Section B explores the IRS’s limited enforcement mechanisms.43  
                                                                                                                           
 33 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 9007; I.R.C. § 501(r) (codified as amended 
I.R.C. § 501); id. § 4959 (2012); id. § 6033(b) (2012); Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes 
in For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Health Care Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of Tax Exemption 
Standards, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1, 54 (1995) (discussing how the IRS determined that a hospital deserved 
tax-exempt status prior to the 2010 amendments). 
 34 See Berg, supra note 8, at 381; Crimm, supra note 33, at 54. 
 35 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); Berg, supra note 8, at 381; Crimm, supra note 33, at 54; supra 
notes 25–30 (outlining the other statutory requirements for obtaining tax-exempt status). 
 36 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-880, VARIATION IN STANDARDS AND GUID-
ANCE LIMITS COMPARISON OF HOW HOSPITALS MEET COMMUNITY BENEFIT REQUIREMENTS 1 
(2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Gilbert, supra note 9, at 150; Karns, supra note 8, at 404–05; 
Nation, supra note 11, at 158–59. 
 37 GAO REPORT, supra note 36, at 1 (“The exemption is based on the principle that the govern-
ment’s loss of tax revenues is offset by its relief from financial burdens that it would otherwise have 
to meet with appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of 
general welfare.”); Gilbert, supra note 9, at 150; Karns, supra note 8, at 519. 
 38 See Karns, supra note 8, at 404–05. 
 39 See id. 
 40 Gilbert, supra note 9, at 150; see Karns, supra note 8, at 404–05. 
 41 See infra notes 44–92 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 44–72 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 73–92 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Community Benefits Standard: A Flexible Approach to  
Hospital Tax Exemption 
In order to obtain tax-exempt status as charitable organizations, hospitals 
must first satisfy the community benefits standard.44 Although the I.R.C. does 
not define the term “charitable,” the IRS has explained that the “promotion of 
health” is a charitable purpose because it generally benefits the community as 
a whole.45 Regardless of the level of free care offered, a hospital is considered 
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes so long as the class 
of persons it serves is broad enough that the whole community benefits.46  
Under this standard, the IRS recognizes six hospital practices as provid-
ing community benefits: (1) operating an emergency room open to all; (2) 
providing care to all persons who are able to pay; (3) accepting patients en-
rolled in public programs like Medicare and Medicaid; (4) creating a board of 
trustees composed of independent civic leaders; (5) providing for an open 
medical staff with privileges available to all qualified persons; and (6) rein-
vesting any surplus funds into operations to improve the quality of patient 
care.47 Accordingly, the IRS conducts a fact-sensitive inquiry when evaluating 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117–18; see Berg, supra note 8, at 380–81; John D. Colombo, 
The Failure of Community Benefit, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 29, 30–31 (2005); Crossley, supra note 11, at 
690; Goodman, supra note 30, at 719; Floyd, supra note 8, at 24. The IRS establishes the standards 
that hospitals must meet to obtain tax-exempt status as charitable organizations. See I.R.C. § 7805 
(2012); see, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2008) (establishing an organizational test 
and operational test for hospitals to maintain tax-exempt status); Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 95 
(refining the standard for hospitals to qualify as charitable organizations); Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 
C.B. 117–18 (describing whether two hypothetical hospitals qualify as charitable organizations); Rev. 
Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202–04 (providing criteria for hospitals seeking tax-exempt status). 
 45 See I.R.C. § 501 (2012); Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118. 
 46 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118 (stating the “[t]he promotion of health . . . is deemed bene-
ficial to the community as a whole even though the class of beneficiaries eligible to receive a direct 
benefit from its activities does not include all members of the community, such as indigent mem-
bers”). 
 47 Id.; see GAO REPORT, supra note 36, at 11; Berg, supra note 8, at 381–82; Noble et al., supra 
note 8, at 118. The IRS established the community benefits standard in one of its Revenue Rulings in 
1969. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118. Revenue Rulings are official IRS interpretations that repre-
sent the IRS’s conclusions about how the I.R.C. applies to a particular set of facts. Treas. Reg. 
§ 601.601 (2001); Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Ret-
roactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 323, 330 (2008). They differ 
from regulations, which function as general interpretative and policy statements. Korb, supra, at 332. 
For a detailed account of the history and policy behind IRS Revenue Rulings, see Kristin E. Hickman, 
IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 243–46; 
Korb, supra, at 330–35. In particular, Revenue Ruling 69-545 examined the tax-exempt status of two 
hypothetical hospitals. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117–18. Under the Revenue Ruling’s analysis, 
Hospital A is exempted from tax because it operates an emergency room open to all; provides hospital 
care to persons in the community who are able to pay for it; maintains an open medical staff; uses its 
surplus funds on expanding facilities, improving quality of care, and on medical training, education 
and research; and the hospital is operated by a board of trustees composed of independent civic lead-
 
2014] Tax-Exempt Hospitals and Intermediate Sanctions 693 
whether a hospital meets these criteria—though the presence or absence of any 
one criterion is not determinative on the IRS’s final determination.48 
Despite the enumeration of the above criteria, the IRS defines the com-
munity benefits standard as broadly as possible in recognition of the diverse 
needs of each tax-exempt hospital’s surrounding community.49 For example, a 
hospital that does not operate an emergency room can still qualify for a tax 
exemption if a state agency determines that an additional emergency room 
would duplicate services already being provided elsewhere in the communi-
ty.50 This is particularly important for many specialty hospitals that lack emer-
                                                                                                                           
ers. Id. Meanwhile, Hospital B is not exempted because it is not operated for the exclusive benefit of 
the public, but instead is substantially operated for the private benefit of its previous owners. Id. Hos-
pital B’s original owners transferred ownership to a nonprofit organization but retained control of the 
hospital through the board of trustees and medical committee, and used that control to restrict medical 
staff privileges, limit emergency room care and hospital admission, and enter into favorable rental 
agreements with the hospital for office space. Id. 
 48 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117–18. There is considerable debate in the hospital industry 
about whether the community benefits criteria should evaluate whether the hospital has bad debt and 
Medicaid or Medicare shortfalls. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2707, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS 
AND THE PROVISION OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS 3, 17 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 CBO REPORT] (noting 
how some industry experts consider Medicaid shortfalls to be a community benefit); Courtney, supra 
note 8, at 382–83 (discussing the conflicting positions of major U.S. hospital associations regarding 
inclusion of bad debt and shortfalls in the community benefits standard analysis); Nancy M. Kane, 
Tax-Exempt Hospitals: What Is Their Charitable Responsibility and How Should It Be Defined and 
Reported?, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 459, 465–66 (2007) (highlighting differences among U.S. hospital 
associations’ positions on bad debt and shortfalls). Bad debt represents uncollectible patient bills. 
Courtney, supra note 8, at 382. It is calculated as the difference between the amounts a hospital ex-
pects to receive as payment for services rendered and the actual payment a hospital receives. 2006 
CBO REPORT, supra, at 2; Courtney, supra note 8, at 382. Similarly, Medicaid and Medicare short-
falls are the unreimbursed costs of services to Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries. 2006 CBO RE-
PORT, supra, at 17; Courtney, supra note 8, at 382. Shortfall is calculated as the difference between 
the cost a hospital incurs in treating a Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary and the actual payment it 
receives from Medicare or Medicaid as reimbursement. 2006 CBO REPORT, supra, at 17; Courtney, 
supra note 8, at 382. The IRS and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services—the federal agen-
cy that administers these programs—have not taken positions on the issue, but both agencies allow 
hospitals to include data on bad debt and shortfall expenses when making these calculations. Court-
ney, supra note 8, at 382–83. 
 49 Thai, supra note 10, at 768; see Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 95; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 
C.B. 118. 
 50 See Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94; Karns, supra note 8, at 404. This was not always the 
case. See E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated, 426 
U.S. 26 (1976); Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117–18. Prior to 1983, the community benefits stand-
ard required a tax-exempt hospital to operate an emergency room open to all, regardless of one’s abil-
ity to pay. See E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 506 F.2d at 1289. This change was somewhat controversial 
because in 1974, in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the IRS’s broad definition of “charitable” in part because the 
standard then in place required hospitals to provide a minimal level of free care through the operation 
of an emergency room open to all, regardless of the ability to pay. See id. The community benefits 
standard as currently formulated has never been challenged, however. See Goodman, supra note 30, at 
719–20. 
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gency rooms (e.g., surgical facilities) or other hospitals that typically treat very 
few Medicare patients (e.g., children’s hospitals).51 Thus, given the broad in-
terpretation of the community benefits standard, a hospital can obtain tax-
exempt status as a charitable organization even if it does not provide any chari-
table care.52 
 In addition to the community benefits standard, hospitals also must com-
ply with the provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) to maintain their tax-exempt status.53 The ACA mandates certain be-
havior and places new constraints on the activities of tax-exempt hospitals.54 
First, it requires a tax-exempt hospital to conduct a community health needs 
assessment (“CHNA”) every three years and to make its findings widely avail-
able to the public.55 Specifically, the CHNA should consider input from vari-
ous representatives from the community that the hospital serves—including 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 95; Karns, supra note 8, at 404. 
 52 See Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94–95; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118.  
 53 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007, 124 Stat. 119, 
128 (2010), amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (adding provisions to the Internal Revenue Code regarding tax-exempt hospi-
tals). Passed in 2010, the ACA introduced comprehensive reforms to the U.S. health insurance system, 
including the imposition of new requirements on tax-exempt hospitals. See id. Section 9007 of the 
ACA added § 501(r) and § 4959 to the Internal Revenue Code and amended § 6033(b). Id. Section 
501(r) details several new requirements that hospitals must meet to receive or retain tax-exempt status. 
I.R.C. § 501(r) (2012). The provisions of § 501(r) became effective for tax years beginning after 
March 23, 2010, except for the community health needs assessment (“CHNA”) requirement, which 
became effective for tax years beginning after March 23, 2012. Id. Sections 4959 and 6033(b) deal 
with the monitoring and enforcement associated with § 501(r). Id. § 4959 (2012); id. § 6033(b) 
(2012). The IRS and the Treasury Department recently proposed rules to guide hospitals in the im-
plementation of § 501(r). Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-1–7, 77 Fed. Reg. 38,148, 38,160–69 (June 26, 
2012). The IRS and Treasury Department solicited comments and instructed taxpayers to rely on the 
proposed regulations unless or until final or temporary regulations are issued. Additional Require-
ments for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38,159; see, e.g., Letter from Melinda Reid Hatton, 
Senior Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, to IRS (Aug. 23, 2012) [hereinafter American Hospital As-
sociation Comment], available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=IRS-2012-0036 (re-
sponding to request for comments on § 501(r)). The rules clarified that the new legislation did not 
replace the requirements on tax-exempt hospitals that were already in place. Additional Requirements 
for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38,148. Accordingly, hospitals must continue to comply with 
the community benefits standard as well as the new ACA requirements. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 
C.B. 117–18; Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38,148; D. Greg 
Goller & Scott M. Sherman, Thoughts and Comments on New Section 501(r), 22 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 
13, 14 (2010). 
 54 See I.R.C. § 501(r). Unlike the Senate Finance Committee’s initial proposal, the new law does 
not require hospitals to provide a minimum level of free, charitable care in exchange for their charita-
ble tax exemption. See id.; Crossley, supra note 11, at 693; Michael N. Fine & Christopher M. Jedrey, 
Hospital Exemption Under Section 501(r) Remains a Work in Progress, 24 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 34, 34 
(2012). 
 55 I.R.C. § 501(r). 
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public health experts.56 Thereafter, the hospital must adopt an “implementation 
strategy” that is designed to meet the community’s health needs as identified in 
the CHNA,57 and the hospital must submit a report to the IRS describing how 
it is addressing the needs identified in its CHNA.58 If a hospital fails to comply 
with the CHNA requirement, it is subject to a $50,000 excise tax.59 
Second, under the ACA, tax-exempt hospitals are required to adopt a 
written financial assistance policy and an emergency care policy.60 A hospital’s 
financial assistance policy complies with the ACA if it specifies the type of 
financial assistance that is available and the eligibility criteria that an individu-
al must meet to receive such assistance.61 The statute and the proposed rules do 
not establish any specific eligibility criteria that a hospital’s financial assis-
tance policy must meet, nor do they mandate a fixed amount or type of finan-
cial assistance a hospital must provide.62 In a hospital’s emergency care policy, 
the hospital must obligate itself to provide emergency medical services to all 
persons, regardless of ability to pay or eligibility for financial assistance.63 The 
emergency care policy also must prohibit debt collection activities from occur-
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. § 6033(b). In addition, the report must include a statement of any needs that are not being 
addressed and the reasons why such needs are being overlooked. Id. 
 59 Id. § 4959 (2012). The proposed regulations do not address the application of the excise tax. 
See Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. 38,148, 38,150–51 (June 26, 
2012). In a Notice and Request for Comments, the IRS advised that it planned to impose the $50,000 
excise tax on hospitals that fail to conduct CHNAs in any three-year period. I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 
2011-30 I.R.B. 60, 65. For example, if a hospital does not conduct CHNAs in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 
2014, it will be subject to an excise tax for both the 2013 or 2014 taxable years. See id. Section 4959’s 
$50,000 excise tax is the only new remedy for the IRS to enforce the ACA’s additional requirements. 
See I.R.C. § 501(r) (2012); id. § 4959; id. § 6033(b) (2012); I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, supra, at 65. 
 60 I.R.C. § 501(r). 
 61 Id.; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-4, 77 Fed. Reg. 38,148, 38,161 (June 26, 2012). The financial 
assistance policy must discuss: (1) the hospital’s eligibility criteria for financial assistance; (2) the 
basis for calculating fees to patients; (3) the method patients must follow to apply for financial assis-
tance; (4) for hospitals that lack a separate billing and collections policy, actions that the hospital may 
take if a patient fails to pay; and (5) the measures that the hospital will take to widely publicize the 
policy within the community it serves. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-4, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38,161. 
 62 Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38,149; Fine & Jedrey, su-
pra note 54, at 37; see I.R.C. § 501(r); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-4, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38,161. 
 63 I.R.C. § 501(r); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-4, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38,164. This requirement essen-
tially mirrors existing federal law under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTA-
LA”). Fine & Jedrey, supra note 54, at 38; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012). EMTALA requires all 
hospitals—tax-exempt and for-profit—to provide stabilizing treatment to any individual who comes to 
the hospital with an emergency medical condition, regardless of the person’s ability to pay. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd. Section 501(r) states that a hospital’s financial assistance policy must require it to provide 
care for emergency medical conditions within the meaning of EMTALA. I.R.C. § 501(r); see 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd (defining “emergency medical condition” to include any severe condition that, if left 
without immediate treatment, could reasonably lead to “placing the health of the individual . . . in 
serious jeopardy”). 
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ring in places where they could interfere with the treatment of emergency med-
ical conditions.64 
Third, the ACA prohibits tax-exempt hospitals from applying gross 
charges to any health care services used by individuals who are eligible for 
financial assistance.65 In addition, the charges to such patients for emergency 
or medically necessary care are capped at the amounts generally billed to per-
sons who have insurance coverage.66 Hospitals may choose between two 
methods of calculating the amount that is generally billed for a particular ser-
vice.67 The “look-back” method uses actual past claims paid to the hospital—
by both Medicare and private health insurers—to determine the applicable 
amount.68 Alternatively, the “prospective” method enables hospitals to esti-
mate the amount that Medicare would reimburse the hospital for the care in 
question if the eligible patient were actually a Medicare fee-for-service benefi-
ciary.69 
Finally, tax-exempt hospitals are now prohibited from engaging in ex-
traordinary collection actions before making a reasonable effort to determine a 
patient’s eligibility for financial assistance.70 Extraordinary collection actions 
occur when a hospital engages a legal or judicial process to procure payment 
of a hospital bill for care that is covered under the hospital’s financial assis-
tance policy.71 It is also considered an extraordinary collection action to sell an 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-4, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38,164. 
 65 I.R.C. § 501(r) (2012); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-5, 77 Fed. Reg. 38,148, 38,165–66 (June 
26, 2012). The proposed regulations define gross charges as “a hospital facility’s full, established 
price for medical care that the hospital facility consistently and uniformly charges all patients before 
applying any contractual allowances, discounts, or deductions.” Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-1, 77 
Fed. Reg. 38,148, 38,161 (June 26, 2012). It is standard in the health care industry for hospitals to list 
the amount of gross charges on a hospital bill as an explanatory item and starting point for employing 
various discounts and deductions. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. 
38,148, 38,155 (June 26, 2012). The IRS will continue to permit this practice so long as the gross 
amount listed is not in fact charged to patients eligible for financial assistance. Id. 
 66 I.R.C. § 501(r). 
 67 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-5, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38,165. 
 68 Id. Medicare is a federal insurance program that pays the costs of hospital care, related post-
hospital care, home health services, and hospice care for individuals aged sixty-five or older. 42 
U.S.C. § 1395c (2012). Medicare beneficiaries are individuals who enjoy Medicare insurance. See id. 
Providers that treat Medicare patients are reimbursed under a fee-for-service model at rates set by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (2012). 
 69 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-5, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38,165. 
 70 I.R.C. § 501(r). 
 71 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-6, 77 Fed. Reg. 38,148, 38,166 (June 26, 2012). Actions that re-
quire a legal or judicial process include: (1) obtaining a lien on an individual’s property; (2) foreclos-
ing on an individual’s real property; (3) attaching or seizing an individual’s personal property; (4) 
commencing a civil suit against an individual; (5) causing an individual’s arrest; (6) subjecting an 
individual to a writ of body attachment; and (7) garnishing an individual’s wages. Id. 
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individual’s debt to a third party or to report adverse information about an in-
dividual to consumer credit reporting agencies.72 
B. Revoke or Do Nothing: A Dearth of Options for Community  
Benefits Standard Enforcement 
Although the IRS receives significant information regarding the activities 
of tax-exempt hospitals, it is limited in its enforcement options against a hospital 
that ceases to meet the community benefits standard.73 In response to such in-
formation, the IRS can either overlook the bad conduct or revoke the hospital’s 
tax-exempt status—there is no middle ground.74 Furthermore, the IRS does not 
have the ability to tailor penalties for a specific violation.75  
The IRS—recognizing that revocation is a drastic action with far-reaching 
effects—has determined that revocation of tax-exempt status is generally inap-
propriate when a hospital meets some but not all of the community benefits 
requirements.76 This hesitance to revoke tax-exempt statutes, however, has far-
reaching effects: estimates as to the exact value of federal income tax exemp-
tions for all charitable hospitals range from $6.1 billion to $50 billion.77 More-
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. 
 73 See I.R.C. § 501 (2012); Berg, supra note 8, at 382; Crossley, supra note 11, at 691; Studdert et 
al., supra note 12, at 626; Levitt, supra note 12, at 14. The IRS monitors hospitals’ compliance with 
the community benefits standard and the new ACA requirements by requiring that hospitals file annu-
al returns using Form 990. I.R.C. § 6033 (2012); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 2 
(2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q37B-9JZE. 
Form 990 solicits information regarding an organization’s exempt and other activities, finances, gov-
ernance, compliance with federal tax filings, and compensation paid to certain persons. INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., supra, at 2–3. Tax-exempt hospitals also use Schedule H to report on community 
benefits activities, including: charity care, bad debt, collections and billings practices, unreimbursed 
costs of government health care programs, and other supplemental information. INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OMB 1545-0047, SCHEDULE H (FORM 990) HOSPITALS 1 
(2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990so.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HRV3-
7BH7[hereinafter SCHEDULE H]. 
 74 See Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626 (reiterating that revocation is the IRS’s sole enforce-
ment tool); Levitt, supra note 12, at 14 (describing revocation as the “only penalty” available). The 
one exception is the IRS’s authority to impose intermediate sanctions when an organization fails the 
requirement that no net earnings inure to the benefit of any individual or private shareholder. Studdert 
et al., supra note 12, at 626; Levitt, supra note 12, at 14. 
 75 See Berg, supra note 8, at 382; Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626; Levitt, supra note 12, at 
14. But see Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate: What Is the I.R.S. Role in Charity 
Governance?, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 537, 543 (1999) (arguing that, as a practical matter, the IRS is able 
to use the threat of revocation to exact specific changes from tax-exempt organizations in the educa-
tional trust context). 
 76 See Berg, supra note 8, at 382; Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626; Levitt, supra note 12, at 
14. 
 77 See Colombo, supra note 23, at 624; Crossley, supra note 11, at 691 n.16. In 2002, the Con-
gressional Budget Office estimated that the tax benefit received by exempt hospitals was worth $6.1 
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over, these hospitals also are exempt from the federal unemployment payroll 
tax and the communications services excise tax.78 Additionally, many state and 
local governments exempt Section 501(c)(3) organizations from state and local 
sales, income, and property taxes.79 Correspondingly, when the IRS revokes a 
hospital’s tax-exempt status, many states and municipalities often follow suit.80 
Thus, when a hospital’s tax-exempt status is revoked, it incurs large federal 
and state tax bills.81 As a result, these large tax bills may cause hospitals to 
reduce the quality of care provided to patients or even close.82  
The harm from revocation of tax-exempt status, however, is broader than 
simply the effects of new tax liabilities.83 Revocation of this status is also like-
ly to affect the viability of the hospital’s ongoing grants that fund medical re-
search and quality health care.84 This is the case because it is the hospital’s 
                                                                                                                           
billion. Crossley, supra note 11, at 691 n.16. More recently, in 2007, the Senate Finance Committee 
estimated that exempt hospitals receive $12.6 to $20 billion in tax benefits each year. STAFF OF S. 
COMM. ON FIN., 110TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT HOSPITALS: DISCUSSION DRAFT 2 (Comm. Print 2007), 
available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/releases/2007/07182007.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
6BVJ-T2DV; Nation, supra note 11, at 174 n.173. A second estimate by the Senate Finance Commit-
tee that year valued the benefit to hospitals at $50 billion. Nation, supra note 11, at 174 n.173. These 
estimates only reflect hospital savings that directly stem from federal and state income tax exemp-
tions. 2006 CBO REPORT, supra note 48, at 3; Crossley, supra note 11, at 691 n.16. 
 78 I.R.C. § 3301 (2012) (establishing a federal unemployment payroll tax); id. § 3306(c)(8) (2012) 
(defining the term “employment” for the purposes of the federal unemployment payroll tax and ex-
cluding employment at a § 501(c)(3) organization); id. § 4251 (2012) (establishing a communications 
services excise tax); id. § 4253(h) (2012) (excluding tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals from the commu-
nications services excise tax). 
 79 Berg, supra note 8, at 380; Crimm, supra note 33, at 7–8 n.19; see Crossley, supra note 11, at 
691 n.16. 
 80 Berg, supra note 8, at 380; Crimm, supra note 33, at 7–8 n.19; see Crossley, supra note 11, at 
691 n.16. Approximately one-half of states automatically grant a state income tax exemption to hospi-
tals that possess a federal exemption. Kathryn J. Jervis, A Review of State Legislation and a State 
Legislator Survey Related to Not-for-Profit Hospital Tax Exemption and Health Care for the Indigent, 
32 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 36, 38 (2005). Alternatively, one-third of states require hospitals to separate-
ly apply for a state income tax exemption, but base their decision on the hospital’s federal status. Id. at 
38–39. 
 81 See Colombo, supra note 23, at 624; Crossley, supra note 11, at 691 n.16. 
 82 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS’ HEALTH RES. INST., ACTS OF CHARITY: CHARITY CARE 
STRATEGIES FOR HOSPITALS IN A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 1, 31 (2005), available at http://www.
pwc.com/us/en/healthcare/publications/act-of-charity.jhtml (investigating the effects of revocation on 
a hypothetical nonprofit hospital and concluding that the hospital’s 2.6% profit margin would change 
to a loss); Berg, supra note 8, at 382 (noting that revocation leads to new tax liabilities for hospitals, 
which could have a negative impact on patient care); Goodman, supra note 30, at 724 (discussing 
concerns that many small, urban tax-exempt hospitals could not survive revocation). 
 83 See Crimm, supra note 33, at 7–8 n.19; Gilbert, supra note 9, at 155–56. 
 84 Berg, supra note 8, at 382. Each year, the National Institute of Health provides millions of 
dollars to nonprofit teaching hospitals in the form of research grants. M. Gregg Bloche, Corporate 
Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035, 1048 (1992); NIH Awards by Location, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (last updated Feb. 28, 2013), http://report.nih.gov/award/
index.cfm?ot=IH&fy=2013&state=&ic=&fm=&orgid=&distr=&rfa=&om=n&pid=, archived at 
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Section 501(c)(3) status that makes it eligible for both federal research grants 
and private grants from foundations.85 Revocation also removes the intangible 
benefits that correspond with being labeled as a tax-exempt charitable organi-
zation, such as the public’s increased trust and favorable perception of the hos-
pital.86 
Moreover, revocation affects a hospital’s ability to raise capital.87 Donors 
prefer to give charitable contributions to Section 501(c)(3) organizations because 
they receive personal tax benefits when they calculate their own income tax, gift 
tax, and estate tax liability.88 As a result, revocation affects previous donors who 
anticipated significant tax benefits from their donations to a tax-exempt organi-
zation.89 These benefits disappear with revocation.90 Finally, revocation also re-
moves a hospital’s ability to issue tax-exempt “qualified bonds,” which provide 
Section 501(c)(3) qualified organizations with an attractive way raise capital.91 
Given the wide-ranging effects of revocation, the IRS rarely takes action against 
hospitals that fail to fully meet the community benefits criteria because the re-
sults often exceed the severity of the infraction.92  
                                                                                                                           
http://perma.cc/6NZW-L44U. An IRS revocation proceeding against a hospital signals to the NIH that 
the hospital is not a proper candidate for such grants. See Berg, supra note 8, at 382. 
 85 Berg, supra note 8, at 380; Bloche, supra note 84, at 1048. 
 86 Berg, supra note 8, at 380. 
 87 See I.R.C. § 170 (2012); id. § 2055 (2012); id. § 2522 (2012); Crimm, supra note 33, at 7–8 
n.19. 
 88 I.R.C. § 170 (establishing a deduction from income tax for charitable contributions); id. § 2055 
(reducing estate tax liability by the amount of all charitable transfers); id. § 2522 (establishing a de-
duction from gift tax for charitable gifts); Crimm, supra note 33, at 7–8 n.19 (cataloging the special 
tax benefits available to § 501(c)(3) organizations). Specifically, individual and corporate donors are 
eligible to receive income tax deductions for charitable donations at the federal and state levels. See 
I.R.C. § 170; Gilbert, supra note 9, at 156. Additionally, individuals are not liable for any federal gift 
taxes on inter vivos transfers to tax-exempt organizations. Id. § 2522; Gilbert, supra note 9, at 156. 
Individuals may also receive credit on estate taxes at the federal and state levels for such donations. 
See I.R.C. § 2055; Gilbert, supra note 9, at 156. 
 89 Berg, supra note 8, at 382. 
 90 See I.R.C. § 170; id. § 2055; id. § 2522; Crimm, supra note 33, at 7–8 n.19. 
 91 See I.R.C. § 145 (2012); Crimm, supra note 33, at 7–8 n.19. A § 501(c)(3) organization may 
issue qualified bonds with lower-than-market interest rates that are still attractive in the market be-
cause the bonds’ after-tax rate of return will equal the market rate. See I.R.C. § 145. 
 92 See G. Edgar Adkins, Jr., Executive Compensation and the Intermediate Sanctions, 24 TAX’N 
OF EXEMPTS 26, 26 (2012) (describing revocation of status as the “death penalty” for tax-exempt 
organizations); Berg, supra note 8, at 382 (noting that the reluctance of the IRS to enforce the criteria 
is due to the draconian results of revocation); Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626 (“The severity [of 
revocation proceedings] has tended to discourage its use.”); Levitt, supra note 12, at 14 (discussing 
the lack of IRS enforcement flexibility due to revocation proceedings’ excessive penalties); supra 
notes 77–91 and accompanying text (describing the wide-ranging effects of revocation). Individual 
states, however, have been far more active in challenging hospitals to provide concrete community 
benefits in exchange for their state tax exemptions, and revoking their status when they do not. Co-
lombo, supra note 44, at 38–39; Nation, supra note 11, at 176. 
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II. THE FAILURE OF THE COMMUNITY BENEFITS STANDARD: HOW TAX-
EXEMPT HOSPITALS ACT UNCHARITABLY 
The IRS’s lack of enforcement flexibility has allowed tax-exempt hospi-
tals to reap huge economic benefits without giving comparable benefits back to 
their communities.93 Remedies are being sought to address this problem.94 The 
IRS has been given enhanced enforcement authority in other areas.95 Section A 
first examines the ramifications of the IRS’s failure to adequately enforce the 
community benefits standard.96 Then, Section B discusses the use of interme-
diate sanctions to regulate the behavior of tax-exempt organizations.97 Section 
B further explains how intermediate sanctions could work to redress the IRS’s 
enforcement problem.98 
A. Hospitals Behaving Badly: The Consequence of the IRS’s Failure to 
Properly Enforce the Community Benefits Standard 
The IRS’s enforcement of the community benefits standard has allowed 
hospitals to act quite uncharitably.99 Most notably, the community benefits 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Colombo, supra note 44, at 51 (arguing that “the community benefit test does not perform 
the function of consistently identifying nonprofits that produce socially worthy outputs meriting re-
ward via exemption”); Nation, supra note 11, at 174–75 (characterizing the tax exemption as “a bad 
deal for taxpayers” because the community benefits standard was the result of poor judgment and 
historical error); Thai, supra note 10, at 768–69 (blaming uncharitable tax-exempt hospital behavior 
on the “vague” wording and indecisive enforcement of the community benefits standard). Supporters 
of the community benefits standard, however, posit that the proliferation of for-profit hospitals into 
the health care market—not the community benefits standard—caused tax-exempt hospitals to employ 
“aggressive business decisions.” See Karns, supra note 8, at 494–95 (disagreeing with exemption 
critics who rebuke tax-exempt hospitals simply for utilizing sound business practices). 
 94 See Beverly Cohen, The Controversy over Hospital Charges to the Uninsured—No Villains, No 
Heroes, 51 VILL. L. REV. 95, 95–97 (2006); Crossley, supra note 11, at 691; Lisa Kinney Helvin, 
Caring for the Uninsured: Are Not-for-Profit Hospitals Doing Their Share?, 8 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 421, 424–27 (2008); Nation, supra note 11, at 175–76; Thai, supra note 10, at 
772. 
 95 See Cohen, supra note 94, at 96–97; Helvin, supra note 94, at 424–27; Nation, supra note 11, 
at 175–76; Thai, supra note 10, at 772. Most states have adopted the federal tax exemption rules and 
community benefits standard. Nation, supra note 11, at 175. Moreover, the new I.R.C. § 501(r) ena-
bles the IRS to impose a $50,000 penalty on hospitals that fail to complete a community health needs 
assessment. I.R.C. § 501(r) (2012); Thai, supra note 10, at 772. 
 96 See infra notes 99–128 and accompanying text.  
 97 See infra notes 129–161 and accompanying text.  
 98 See infra notes 129–161 and accompanying text.  
 99 See M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the Charitable 
Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299, 359 (1995) (arguing that because hospitals have virtually unre-
stricted access to tax exemptions, the benefits function like a general government subsidy for hospital 
services); Colombo, supra note 44, at 41–42 (discussing how the community benefits standard fails to 
isolate differences between tax-exempt and for-profit hospital behavior); Karns, supra note 8, at 520 
(concluding that the tax exemption has not achieved the goal of providing additional health care); 
Goodman, supra note 30, at 719 (criticizing the community benefits standard because it does not dif-
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standard does not explicitly require hospitals to provide free care to qualify for 
tax exemption.100 Through the use of a flexible standard with no explicit chari-
table care requirements, the IRS has sought to recognize that each hospital is 
unique and has diverse needs that stem from its surrounding community.101 As 
a result, the flexibility of the community benefits standard allows specialty 
hospitals that benefit their communities in many ways but lack emergency 
rooms or have few or no indigent patients—such as surgical facilities and chil-
dren’s hospitals—to obtain exemptions.102 Accordingly, the IRS anticipates 
that these tax-exempt hospitals will make up for the foregone taxes by serving 
their communities in other ways by, for example, conducting research or offer-
ing health education to the public.103 These other activities are expected to be-
stow tangible economic and social benefits to the community—as is neces-
sary—in order to justify the government’s forfeiture of millions of dollars in 
tax revenue.104 In practice, however, there is rarely such a reciprocal exchange 
of benefits.105 
Although the IRS expects that a tax-exempt hospital with no charitable 
care would be the exception, this scenario is quite common.106 Many tax-
exempt hospitals provide little free care, with some provide no free care what-
soever.107 In practice, most of the exceptional tax-exempt hospitals that pro-
vide significant charitable care are those that are government-run or serve as 
teaching hospitals—not private nonprofit hospitals.108 Thus, the responsibility 
of picking up the tab for care to indigent patients—as is it primarily performed 
by government and teaching hospitals, both of which are publically support-
                                                                                                                           
ferentiate between the necessary behavior of a tax-exempt hospital vis-à-vis a regular for-profit hospi-
tal).  
 100 Nation, supra note 11, at 170; see Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 95; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-
2 C.B. 118; Colombo, supra note 44, at 49. But see Helvin, supra note 94, at 444–45 (arguing that it is 
considerably difficult for a hospital to obtain tax-exempt status without a charitable care program). 
 101 Thai, supra note 10, at 768; see Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 95; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 
C.B. 118. 
 102 See Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94; Karns, supra note 8, at 404. 
 103 See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118; Colombo, supra note 23, at 626; Nation, supra note 
11, at 168; Goodman, supra note 30, at 719–20. 
 104 See Courtney, supra note 8, at 366. 
 105 See Colombo, supra note 44, at 46–47; Karns, supra note 8, at 521; Nation, supra note 11, at 
174. For example, in 2007, ten Massachusetts hospital companies received $638 million in tax bene-
fits, which exceeded the value of community benefits they provided—including indigent care and 
other charity work—by more than $264 million. Courtney, supra note 8, at 366. 
 106 Cohen, supra note 94, at 103–04; Colombo, supra note 44, at 49. 
 107 See Cohen, supra note 94, at 103–04 (detailing investigational reports about tax-exempt hospi-
tals that did not provide any charity care or failed to publicize their limited charity care programs); 
Colombo, supra note 44, at 47–49 (studying empirical data that shows the lack of differences between 
tax-exempt and for-profit hospitals); Nation, supra note 11, at 170–72 (arguing that the billions of 
dollars that tax-exempt hospitals save in taxes is ultimately paid by taxpayers). 
 108 Colombo, supra note 44, at 49. 
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ed—primarily falls on the government and taxpayers.109 The IRS, however, has 
no way to remedy this problem because of its “all or nothing” enforcement 
tools.110 
As a result, the IRS has been unsuccessful in challenging a medical or-
ganization’s Section 501(c)(3) status when the organization minimally meets 
the community benefits standard.111 In 1978, in Sound Health Ass’n v. Com-
missioner, the Tax Court determined that a medical organization must only 
minimally satisfy the community benefits standard in order to maintain its tax-
exempt status.112 In South Health Ass’n, the organization was able to maintain 
its tax-exempt status even though it required prepayment for services that 
lacked a donative element and provided preferential medical treatment to its 
paying subscribers.113 The court reasoned that the organization minimally met 
the community benefits standard because it operated an emergency room open 
to all, established a research program that studied ways to improve health care 
delivery, maintained a medical staff open to all qualified physicians, and had a 
board of directors composed of prominent members of the community.114 After 
South Health Ass’n, it became clear that when a hospital minimally meets the 
community benefits standard, the IRS is powerless to change the hospital’s 
behavior.115 
The IRS is equally powerless when tax-exempt hospitals—engaging in 
particularly egregious behavior—flagrantly disregard the community benefits 
standard.116 One common—yet flagrant—course of action involves charging 
uninsured indigent persons much higher rates than the insured for the same 
                                                                                                                           
 109 Id.; Cohen, supra note 94, at 103–04. 
 110 See I.R.C. § 501 (2012); Sound Health Ass’n v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 158, 159 (1978); Rev. Rul. 
69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118; supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (describing the “all or nothing” 
enforcement tools of the IRS). 
 111 See, e.g., Sound Health Ass’n, 71 T.C. at 188. 
 112 See id. at 187–88. Sound Health Association operated as a Health Maintenance Organization 
(HMO), not a hospital. Id. at 174. The court determined, however, that the tests for granting HMOs 
tax-exempt status should be substantially similar to those applied to determine the status of hospitals. 
Id. at 178–79. As is the case with hospitals, the basis of an HMO’s tax-exempt status rests on its pro-
vision of charitable health care services. Id. at 179. 
 113 Id. at 167–68. 
 114 Id. at 184–85; see Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. 
 115 See 71 T.C. at 187–88 (overruling the IRS and reinstating tax-exempt status to a hospital that 
minimally met the community benefits standard). 
 116 See Crossley, supra note 11, at 691 (noting accounts of hospitals treating indigent patients in a 
“distinctly uncharitable fashion”); Nation, supra note 11, at 170 (discussing charitable hospitals’ harsh 
treatment of the poor); Thai, supra note 10, at 770–71 (reviewing the high prices hospitals charge to 
uninsured patients and their predatory collection practices). See generally Cohen, supra note 94 
(providing extensive discussion of the many investigational reports and newspaper articles that high-
lighted aggressive hospital practices); Helvin, supra note 94 (examining the highly publicized cases of 
egregious hospital behavior). 
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services.117 Indigent patients routinely are denied non-emergency care if they 
are unable to pay upfront.118 Moreover, when treatment is provided before 
payment, tax-exempt hospitals often engage in aggressive collection tech-
niques if the full bill is not paid on time.119 Such aggressive collection tech-
niques can involve sending excessive letters, making repeated phone calls, su-
ing patients, garnishing wages and bank accounts, and taking liens on patients’ 
homes.120 This problem is exacerbated by the reality that patients often do not 
realize how large their hospital bills will be.121 When they fill out financial aid 
paperwork prior to treatment, they assume—often incorrectly—that the proce-
dures will be covered.122 Despite this dynamic, the IRS remains reluctant to 
take enforcement action against tax-exempt hospitals that engage in such prac-
tices because revocation is such a drastic step and the hospitals may otherwise 
be meeting community benefits standards.123 Federal courts have also been 
unwilling to get involved to prevent these uncharitable practices.124 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Nation, supra note 11, at 170. Hospitals are required to formulate a “chargemaster,” which is a 
list of prices for their health care services. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 77, at 13. Private 
insurance companies negotiate their reimbursement rates with hospitals and receive large discounts off 
the “chargemaster” price. Id.; Cohen, supra note 94, at 100; Helvin, supra note 94, at 424. Medicare 
and Medicaid also set their own reimbursement rates, which are typically lower than the “chargemas-
ter” rates. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 77, at 13; Cohen, supra note 94, at 100; Helvin, 
supra note 94, at 424. Alternatively, uninsured patients are charged the full “chargemaster” rates. 
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 77, at 13 (noting that self-paying patients are sometimes 
charged two or three times more than private and public payers for the same services); Cohen, supra 
note 94, at 101 (“Through ‘the insanity of the system,’ uninsured patients, those who are least able to 
pay, are charged at the highest point of the rate scale.”); see Helvin, supra note 94, at 424 (explaining 
how 1980s reforms that cut hospital reimbursement rates from third-party payers caused hospitals to 
aggressively seek full payment from self-paying patients). 
 118 Nation, supra note 11, at 170. 
 119 Id.; Thai, supra note 10, at 770–71. 
 120 Thai, supra note 10, at 771. For example, in one year, Carilion Clinic, a Virginia-based 
501(c)(3) hospital, sued 9888 patients, garnished the wages of 5478 former patients, and placed liens 
on the homes of 3920 former patients. Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 15, at 16 (statement of Mark Everson, Commis-
sioner, Internal Revenue Service) (stating that the IRS has not been able to do enough enforcement 
regarding tax-exempt hospitals because revocation causes “disproportionate hardship”); Berg, supra 
note 8, at 382 (discussing the IRS’s hesitancy to enforce the community benefits standard through 
revocation because of the “drastic” effects); Thai, supra note 10, at 771 (highlighting inappropriate 
activities of some tax-exempt hospitals); see also Cecilia M. Jardon McGregor, The Community Bene-
fit Standard for Non-Profit Hospitals: Which Community, and for Whose Benefit?, 23 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 302, 338–39 (2007) (considering the negative effects of eliminating a hospital 
tax exemption); Kane, supra note 48, at 471 (discussing the consequences of revoking tax-exempt 
status for hospitals). 
 124 See Helvin, supra note 94, at 427; Mitchell Zamoff & Christopher Zaetta, Plaintiff’s Lawyers 
Launch “Second Offensive,” AHA NEWS, Mar. 7, 2005, at 4, 4. In 2004, a group of plaintiffs’ lawyers 
filed a series of class action lawsuits against tax-exempt hospitals in federal courts around the country. 
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In sum, the IRS has been unsuccessful in regulating tax-exempt hospital 
behavior.125 The community benefits standard—which evaluates a number of 
factors—leaves the IRS only has one real enforcement option: revocation of 
Section 501(c)(3) status.126 As a result, it is currently very difficult for the IRS 
to shape hospital behavior regarding any one factor in particular.127 As the IRS 
looks on, tax-exempt hospitals continue to engage in egregiously uncharitable 
behavior.128 
B. Intermediate Sanctions: A Limited Attempt to Control the Behavior of 
Tax-Exempt Organizations 
To address the IRS’s “all or nothing” enforcement problem, Congress 
passed the 1996 Taxpayer Bill of Rights, which created intermediate sanctions 
as a limited enforcement tool.129 Prior to the enactment of this legislation, if a 
charitable organization did not comply with the Section 501 requirement that 
                                                                                                                           
Zamoff & Zaetta, supra. They claimed that the hospitals charged uninsured patients higher rates than 
insured patients and engaged in abusive collections practices in violation of their obligations as tax-
exempt organizations. Id. The plaintiffs contended that Section 501(c)(3) created a private cause of 
action and sought to recover as damages the taxes that the hospitals had not paid due to their tax-
exempt status. Id. Alternatively, they sought to hold the hospitals liable under state law theories that 
included breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. 
Cohen, supra note 94, at 112–13; Zamoff & Zaetta, supra. Federal courts resoundingly rejected both 
theories of liability. Zamoff & Zaetta, supra; see, e.g., Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493 F.3d 
521, 523–24 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming the denial of class certification for a group of uninsured pa-
tients, who received medical care from their tax-exempt provider and were then billed at undiscounted 
rates, because “individualized issues . . . overwhelm class cohesiveness”); Urquhart v. Manatee Mem’l 
Hosp., No. 8:06-CV-1418-T-17-EAJ, 2007 WL 781738, at *2, *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2007) (granting 
a motion to dismiss claim against tax-exempt hospital because plaintiffs failed to allege any damages 
that were related to hospital’s charging of allegedly unreasonable rates for medical treatment); Fergu-
son v. Centura Health Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1019 (D. Colo. 2004) (“The plaintiffs’ claims 
under § 501(c)(3) fail because formulating federal health care policy is not a proper function of an 
Article III court.”). 
 125 Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 15, at 10 (statement of Mark Everson, Commissioner, 
Internal Revenue Service) (testifying that the IRS does not have sufficient enforcement tools and 
cannot properly differentiate between for-profit and tax-exempt hospitals); Colombo, supra note 44, at 
41–42 (describing how the community benefits standard fails to distinguish for-profit and tax-exempt 
profit behavior). 
 126 See I.R.C. § 501 (2012); Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 985 F.2d 1210, 1219 (3d Cir. 
1993); Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118. 
 127 See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118. 
 128 See Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 15, at 8–9 (statement of Mark Everson, Commis-
sioner, Internal Revenue Service); Colombo, supra note 44, at 46-47; Karns, supra note 8, at 521; 
Goodman, supra note 30, at 719. 
 129 See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1475 (1996) (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 4958 (2012)); Caracci v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 379, 414 (2002) (explaining how the 
Treasury Department realized that revocation “might be inappropriate when the exempt organization 
did not conform to all the applicable rules but was nevertheless capable of functioning for a charitable 
purpose”), rev’d on other grounds, 456 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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no net earnings inure to the benefit of any individual or private shareholder, the 
IRS’s sole recourse was to revoke the organization’s exemption.130 Section 
4958 of the legislation—now incorporated as Section 4958 of the I.R.C.—
solved this problem, as it permits the IRS to impose excise taxes on persons 
who gain from “excess benefit” transactions with tax-exempt organizations, 
including hospitals.131 An excess benefit transaction—as defined by Section 
4958—is “any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an ap-
plicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any 
disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the 
value of the consideration.”132 For example, an excess benefit transaction oc-
curs when a tax-exempt hospital acquires a product for higher than market val-
ue from a board member or another “disqualified” person.133  
Disqualified persons are persons who are in a position, or who have been 
in a position in the last five years prior to the transaction, to exercise substan-
tial influence over the organization’s affairs.134 Accordingly, persons who make 
substantial charitable contributions to the organization and persons who have 
control over all or part of the budget of an organization also are disqualified 
persons.135 Under this standard, the IRS has the burden of proof to show that 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See Caracci, 118 T.C. at 414. This same problem—as this Note has explained—continues to 
exist with regard to enforcement of the community benefits standard. See supra notes 111–124 and 
accompanying text (discussing the difficulties with enforcement of the community benefits standard). 
 131 See I.R.C. § 4958; Caracci, 118 T.C. at 414; Adkins, supra note 92, at 26; Noble et al., supra 
note 8, at 119; Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626; Levitt, supra note 12, at 14. 
 132 I.R.C. § 4958. 
 133 See id. Other common excess benefit transactions involve the compensation of disqualified 
persons, the sale of property between a tax-exempt organization and a disqualified person, a loan 
between an organization and a disqualified person, and the use by a disqualified person of an organi-
zation’s assets. Levitt, supra note 12, at 14. 
 134 I.R.C. § 4958; see Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3 (as amended in 2009) (expounding on the defini-
tion of a disqualified person). Disqualified persons include the directors, certain officers, and key 
employees of the organization, as well as their family members. Levitt, supra note 12, at 14; see 
I.R.C. § 4958; see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201225016 (June 22, 2012) (determining that an organi-
zation’s corporate officers and office manager Councilman were disqualified persons under § 4958); 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201131024 (Aug. 5, 2011) (determining that an organization’s founder and his 
daughter were disqualified persons under § 4958); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200829049 (July 18, 2008) 
(determining that a board member of an organization was a disqualified person under § 4958). An 
entity is considered a disqualified person when disqualified individuals control thirty-five percent of 
the entity. I.R.C. § 4958. In the case of a corporation, this occurs when persons, who are in positions 
to exercise substantial influence over the organization’s affairs, or their family members, own more 
than thirty-five percent of the total combined voting power. Id. For a partnership, this occurs when 
such persons own more than thirty-five percent of the profits interest. Id. A trust or estate is consid-
ered a disqualified person when such persons own more than thirty-five percent of the beneficial in-
terest. Id. 
 135 Levitt, supra note 12, at 14; see I.R.C. § 4958 (2012). 
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an excess benefit transaction has occurred between a disqualified person and 
an applicable tax-exempt organization.136 
If the IRS satisfies its burden, it may impose tax liability—on top of ordi-
nary income tax liability—as a sanction on the benefitting disqualified person, 
or on both the person and the participating organization’s managers.137 A dis-
qualified person who benefits from an excess benefit transaction may be taxed 
on twenty-five percent of the excess benefit received.138 The value of the ex-
cess benefit is calculated by subtracting the economic benefit that the disquali-
fied person provided to the applicable organization from the economic benefit 
the disqualified person received from the organization.139 The disqualified per-
son also must correct the excess benefit by returning it to the organization 
within the taxable period.140 If the excess benefit is not corrected during this 
time, the IRS additionally may tax the disqualified person’s excess benefit at 
two hundred percent.141 Moreover, the managers of an organization who know-
ingly, willfully, and without reasonable cause take part in an excess benefit 
transaction can be held liable individually for a tax of ten percent of the excess 
benefit.142 A manager’s tax liability, however, cannot exceed $20,000 for any 
individual excess benefit transaction.143 
The focus of these intermediate sanctions is exclusively on the Section 
501(c)(3) requirement that no net earnings inure to the benefit of any individu-
al or private shareholder.144 Section 4958 is designed to prevent persons with 
influence over a tax-exempt organization from using their power to extract a 
personal, private benefit from the operation of the organization.145 According-
ly, these intermediate sanctions are not available remedies in the instances 
when organizations fail to meet or maintain the community benefits stand-
ard.146 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2006) (giving disqualified persons a rebuttable presumption of rea-
sonableness in transactions with the organization under a compensation arrangement). 
 137 I.R.C. § 4958. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. An excess benefit transaction is corrected when the disqualified person acts to undo the 
excess benefit to the extent possible and takes any additional necessary measures to place the organi-
zation back in a financial position that is not worse than the position that it would have been in had the 
disqualified person acted under the highest fiduciary standard. Id. In order to avoid additional tax 
liability, the disqualified person must correct the transaction within the taxable period. Id. The taxable 
period begins on the date that the transaction occurs and ends on the earlier of the date of mailing the 
excess benefit tax deficiency notice and the date of the excess benefit tax assessment. Id. 
 141 I.R.C. § 4958 (2012). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); id. § 4958. 
 145 See Berg, supra note 8, at 382; Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626. 
 146 Berg, supra note 8, at 382; see I.R.C. § 4958. 
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Although intermediate sanctions have rarely been imposed in the hospital 
setting, they have been used successfully in other contexts.147 The IRS engaged 
in two major projects designed to discover and cease excess benefit transac-
tions from 2004 to 2007, looking specifically at the compensation and benefits 
that tax-exempt organizations paid to their executives and directors.148 Approx-
imately 2000 tax-exempt organizations—including hospitals and other health 
care organizations—were sent compliance check letters.149 Ultimately, the IRS 
either proposed to assess or actually assessed excise taxes under Section 4958 
on twenty-five organizations.150 None of the selected organizations, however, 
were hospitals.151 Although the IRS recognized that some hospitals’ executive 
compensation levels would “appear high to some,” it concluded that they were 
not so high as to constitute any excess benefit transactions.152 
Intermediate sanctions—like the sanction available under Section 4958—
may implicate complex issues of valuation.153 For example, in 2006, in Carac-
ci v. Commissioner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered 
the imposition of excise taxes on three privately held home-health agencies 
that had converted from nonprofit tax-exempt entities to for-profit entities.154 
The Tax Court applied Section 4958 and found that the taxpayers owed 
$69,702,390 in excise taxes because they had received a net excess benefit.155 
The Fifth Circuit reversed.156 The court held that the IRS and the Tax Court 
had made a “cascade of errors” in their valuation methods and in other are-
as.157 First, the IRS levied the initial tax based on calculations that the Fifth 
                                                                                                                           
 147 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS HOSPITAL STUDY: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY OF FINAL REPORT 1, 4 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/execsum_
hospprojrept.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BR4Y-VG8R [hereinafter HOSPITAL STUDY EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY]; Berg, supra note 8, at 382; Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626. 
 148 Lawrence E. Singer, Leveraging Tax-Exempt Status of Hospitals, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 41, 50–51 
(2008); IRS Sharpens Focus on Tax-Exempt Organization Compensation, MCDERMOTT WILL & EM-
ERY (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.mwe.com/publications/uniEntity.aspx?xpST=PublicationDetail&
pub=5380, archived at http://perma.cc/DR2X-QRR9. 
 149 IRS Sharpens Focus on Tax-Exempt Organization Compensation, supra note 148. 
 150 Id. Excise taxes were also proposed or assessed against forty disqualified persons and organi-
zational managers. Id. The taxes were worth over $21 million in the aggregate, not including the cost 
that organizations would have to pay to correct the excess benefits. Id. 
 151 HOSPITAL STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 147, at 4. 
 152 Id. 
 153 See Caracci v. Comm’r, 456 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 2006); Bernadette M. Broccolo et al., The 
Price Is Right!—Taxpayers Prevail in the First Case to Review IRS Imposition of Intermediate Sanc-
tions, HEALTH LAW., Oct. 2006, at 1, 1. 
 154 See 456 F.3d at 450. 
 155 Caracci, 118 T.C. at 417. 
 156 Caracci, 456 F.3d at 450. 
 157 Id. at 456. 
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Circuit described as “brief, intermediate internal analysis.”158 And, second, the 
excise tax amount ordered was not offset by a calculation of the liabilities that 
the entities had assumed when converting from tax-exempt to nonexempt enti-
ties.159 The Fifth Circuit also held that the Tax Court acted improperly because it 
failed to place the burden of proof on the IRS to show that the taxpayers owed 
the correct amount of taxes.160 For these reasons, Caracci underscores the valua-
tion difficulties that can affect a Section 4958 excess benefit analysis.161  
III. RIGHTING A WRONG: HOW TO ENFORCE THE COMMUNITY BENEFITS 
STANDARD USING INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS 
Scholars have suggested a variety of solutions to change the way in which 
the IRS evaluates whether a hospital qualifies as charitable.162 The solutions 
proposed thus far all have something in common: they all examine the test that 
nonprofit hospitals must meet in order to qualify for tax exemption.163 Because 
the community benefits standard has proven difficult to administer,164 it is un-
                                                                                                                           
 158 Id. (noting that the analysis itself stated that it was intermediate and would require further 
study). 
 159 Id. at 450, 457 (describing how the failure to offset led to a vast overstatement of tax liability). 
 160 Id. at 457–58 (noting that the failure to place the burden of proof on the IRS was an “error”). 
 161 See id. at 447; Allen D. Hahn, Caracci and the Valuation of Exempt Organizations, 40 J. 
HEALTH L. 267, 279–88 (2007) (discussing Caracci’s lessons for properly conducting the § 4958 
valuation analysis); Broccolo et al., supra note 153, at 4 (identifying Caracci’s implications for the 
valuation of excess benefits in the health care industry). 
 162 See Colombo, supra note 44, at 29, 52–53; Crimm, supra note 33, at 103; Nation, supra note 
11, at 206; Noble et al., supra note 8, at 131. Some have called for a repeal of the community benefits 
standard entirely. See Bloche, supra note 99, at 404–05 (arguing for the repeal of the community ben-
efits standard and, ultimately, for the phase-out of all tax exemptions for nonprofit hospitals); Crimm, 
supra note 33, at 103 (proposing a completely different tax regime as an alternative to the community 
benefits standard); Nation, supra note 11, at 206 (proposing that the community benefits standard be 
replaced by limiting the definition of “charitable” to the provision of free care to the public). Others 
propose tying tax-exempt status to set levels of charity care. See Noble et al., supra note 8, at 131. For 
example, Texas has statutorily mandated charity care as a requirement for a state tax exemption. Id. At 
least one scholar has discussed reformulating the community benefits standard based on enhancing 
access to desirable health care services. See Colombo, supra note 44, at 62–63. Another has proposed 
reformulating the system for tax exemptions entirely, and making available a tax deduction or credit to 
reward both for-profit and nonprofit health care providers that engage in certain desirable charitable 
activities. Crimm, supra note 33, at 103–04. 
 163 See Colombo, supra note 44, at 62–63 (proposing to reformulate the community benefits test 
based on enhancing access to desirable health care services); Crimm, supra note 33, at 103–04 (advo-
cating for repeal of the tax exemption to be replaced by a system of tax deductions and government 
subsidies to reward nonprofit and for-profit hospitals that engage in broadly defined charitable activi-
ties); Nation, supra note 11, at 206 (endorsing a narrow definition of charitable so that hospitals are 
allowed only a tax deduction for the marginal cost of any free care provided); Noble et al., supra note 
8, at 131 (recommending national consistency with regard to state and federal attempts to define 
“charity” and “community benefits”). 
 164 See Cohen, supra note 94, at 95–97; Crossley, supra note 11, at 691; Helvin, supra note 94, at 
424–27; Nation, supra note 11, at 175–76; Thai, supra note 10, at 772. 
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deniably beneficial for academics and lawmakers to thoroughly evaluate the 
standard to see how it can be better implemented.165 As the health care envi-
ronment in the United States continues to evolve, it has become even more 
worthwhile to challenge the standard and tweak it accordingly.166 
The currently proposed solutions, however, do not address the most seri-
ous problem facing the administration of tax-exempt status for hospitals: the 
lack of flexibility with the IRS’s enforcement powers.167 The IRS has not vig-
orously enforced the community benefits standard because its only option is 
revocation of status, which often sounds the death knell for the hospital.168 
This Part argues that Congress should give the IRS statutory authority to em-
ploy intermediate sanctions against hospitals that fail to uphold their obliga-
tions under the community benefits standard and the ACA.169 Giving the IRS 
this power would enable the service to target discrete unsatisfactory hospital 
practices and take action against them.170 Moreover, intermediate sanctions 
would allow the IRS to better regulate tax-exempt hospital behavior while en-
suring that communities benefit from their services.171 
Accordingly, Section 4958 intermediate sanctions should be adapted to 
work with the community benefits regime to determine whether a hospital 
should incur tax liability.172 The current intermediate sanctions available to the 
IRS are only penalty excise taxes that may be imposed on a disqualified person 
who benefits from an excess benefit transaction with a tax-exempt organiza-
tion.173 Under these existing sanctions, the IRS may levy a tax upon the disquali-
fied person and the participating organization’s managers, but not the organiza-
                                                                                                                           
 165 See Colombo, supra note 44, at 62–63; Crimm, supra note 33, at 103–04; Nation, supra note 
11, at 206; Noble et al., supra note 8, at 131. 
 166 See Colombo, supra note 44, at 52–63 (addressing scholarly arguments for and against the 
community benefits standard and proposing an access-based solution). 
 167 See, e.g., id. at 62–63 (proposing an “enhancing access” standard for exemption); Crimm, 
supra note 33, at 103–05 (arguing for favorable tax treatment for broadly defined charitable behav-
iors); Nation, supra note 11, at 206 (advocating for a narrower standard for exemption); Noble et al., 
supra note 8, at 131 (recommending a nationally consistent standard for exemption); supra notes 111–
124 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties that the IRS and courts have faced in enforcing 
the community benefits standard). 
 168 See supra notes 73–92 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of appropriate enforcement 
options and the negative consequences of revocation). 
 169 See infra notes 172–243 and accompanying text. 
 170 See I.R.C. § 4958 (2012); Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 15, at 8–9 (statement of 
Mark Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service); Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626. 
 171 See Berg, supra note 8, at 382 (discussing the IRS’s reluctance to enforce the standard due to 
the draconian results of revocation); Studdert et al., supra note 12, at 626 (“The severity [of revoca-
tion proceedings] has tended to discourage its use.”); Levitt, supra note 12, at 14 (noting the absence 
of IRS enforcement flexibility with regards to the community benefits standard). 
 172 See I.R.C. § 4958; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118. 
 173 I.R.C. § 4958; see supra notes 129–161 and accompanying text (providing background on 
I.R.C. § 4958 and its application). 
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tion itself.174 In a similar way, in the community benefits context, the IRS should 
have the authority to impose tax liability directly on a violating hospital.175 
To enforce the community benefits standard, however, the valuation 
methodology for Section 4958 intermediate sanctions would need to be modi-
fied.176 Under Section 4958, a disqualified person is taxed on twenty-five per-
cent of the excess benefit received.177 Additionally, if the benefit is not re-
turned to the organization within a certain timeframe, the person is taxed on 
two hundred percent of the benefit retained.178 The IRS calculates the value of 
the excess benefit by subtracting the economic benefit that the disqualified 
person provided to the tax-exempt organization from the economic benefit the 
disqualified person received from the organization.179 
The intermediate sanctions imposed to enforce the community benefits 
standard should mirror the ACA’s community health needs assessment penal-
ties.180 Such intermediate sanctions could expand the new $50,000 penalty ap-
plied to hospitals that fail to comply with the community health needs assess-
ment requirement.181 Specifically, legislation could give the IRS authority to 
                                                                                                                           
 174 I.R.C. § 4958. 
 175 See id. (imposing tax liability on a disqualified person or on an organization’s managers, but 
not the organization itself). Section 4958 created intermediate sanctions to deter or punish a disquali-
fied person engaging in an inappropriate transaction. See id.; Caracci v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 379, 417 
(2002) (“[I]ntermediate sanctions are the sole sanction imposed in those cases in which the excess 
benefit does not rise to a level where it calls into question whether . . . the organization functions as a 
charitable . . . organization.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, at 106 n.15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143, 1191) (internal quotation marks omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 456 F.3d 444 
(5th Cir. 2006); Adkins, supra note 92, at 26. Conversely, the proposed model encourages hospitals to 
follow the community benefits standard to avoid organizational exposure to intermediate sanctions 
because revocation has not served a proper deterrent function. See Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra 
note 15, at 9 (statement of Mark Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service); Colombo, supra 
note 44, at 41–42; Crossley, supra note 11, at 701. 
 176 See I.R.C. § 4958 (2012); Hahn, supra note 161, at 279–88 (discussing proper valuation meth-
ods for applying intermediate sanctions). 
 177 I.R.C. § 4958. In addition, an organization’s managers who knowingly, willfully, and without 
reasonable cause take part in an excess benefit transaction can be held liable for a tax of ten percent of 
the excess benefit, not to exceed $20,000. Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. For a more complete description of the methodology for valuing § 4958 intermediate sanc-
tions, see supra notes 132–143 and accompanying text. 
 180 See I.R.C. § 4958; Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 15, at 9 (statement of Mark Ever-
son, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service) (explaining that the IRS does not currently have the 
tools to properly enforce the community benefits standard); Hahn, supra note 161, at 279–88 (describ-
ing the function of intermediate sanctions in the excess benefit context); Colombo, supra note 44, at 
41–42 (critiquing the lack of a “specific, quantifiable” community benefits standard); Crossley, supra 
note 11, at 701 (arguing that hospitals are unlikely to change behavior without “meaningful prodding” 
in the form of economic sanctions). 
 181 I.R.C. § 4959 (2012) (establishing a $50,000 penalty excise tax for any hospital that fails to 
conduct a community health needs assessment). For a comprehensive explanation of the community 
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impose a $50,000 excise tax on any tax-exempt hospital that engages in a dis-
crete behavior that is contrary to the purpose and intent of the community ben-
efits standard.182 For example, the IRS could use this tool if hospitals offer too 
little charity care or fail to provide health education to the public.183  
Furthermore, legislation could allow the IRS to impose a twenty-five per-
cent tax on hospitals that continued to engage in undesirable behavior.184 This 
scheme could resemble Section 4958’s twenty-five percent tax on individuals 
who benefit from excess benefit transactions.185 Under this scheme, the IRS 
first would calculate a hospital’s income tax as if that hospital were not tax-
exempt.186 It would then calculate the estimated costs of all the hospital’s 
community benefits activities.187 Next, the IRS would subtract the sum of the 
value of the hospital’s community benefits activities from the hospital’s hypo-
thetical income tax liability.188 This number represents the approximate benefit 
that the hospital receives for being tax-exempt, over and above the amount it 
returns to the community in the form of community benefits activities.189 Un-
der this Note’s proposed plan, the IRS could be given authority to tax the hos-
pital twenty-five percent of that value as a more extreme measure—short of 
revocation—to pressure hospitals into full compliance with the community 
benefits standard.190 
The $50,000 excise tax on isolated, unsatisfactory practices helps to pair 
the flexible community benefits standard with a correspondingly flexible en-
forcement mechanism.191 This is necessary in this instance because, although a 
flexible standard for tax exemption is desirable, it is only workable when 
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55–59 and accompanying text. 
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 184 See I.R.C. § 4958 (2012). 
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174. 
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paired with a flexible enforcement mechanism.192 Flexibility is desirable be-
cause every community has distinct needs in terms of what it wants or requires 
from a tax-exempt hospital.193 For example, some communities may have a 
large population of indigent patients who require significant amounts of subsi-
dized or free care.194 Other communities, however, may be less in need of free 
care, but have a large percentage of Medicare or Medicaid enrollees and need 
their local hospitals to address Medicare and Medicaid shortfalls.195 Yet other 
communities may benefit from substantial health education and outreach pro-
grams.196 
Because of each community’s varying needs, the current system allows 
the IRS to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether tax-
exempt status for a hospital is warranted.197 If a hospital engages in a discrete 
undesirable practice, such as providing extremely little charitable care, an ex-
emption may still be granted if this practice is balanced by desirable hospital 
characteristics.198 The current model, however, allows hospitals to flagrantly 
disregard the community benefits standard without consequences.199 With the 
flat excise tax, however, the IRS could correct any harmful hospital practices, 
while still allowing an otherwise deserving hospital to keep its exemption.200 
The proposed intermediate sanctions model also would rationally link the 
enforcement of the hospital tax exemption to the policy underlying it.201 A cen-
tral policy justification for the exemption is that the government’s lost tax rev-
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enues are offset by its relief from obligations that it would otherwise have to 
meet in promoting the general welfare.202 Here, challenged hospitals that fail to 
clean up their acts are effectively taxed on the value of their exemption to the 
extent that such value exceeds the benefits that they are giving back to the 
community.203 Giving the IRS the ability to impose—or perhaps more im-
portantly, to threaten to impose—such penalty taxes on tax-exempt hospitals 
should motivate the hospitals to change their behavior in a way that simply 
revising the test for exemption or threatening revocation has not.204 
This model will likely prompt two key challenges.205 First, critics may ar-
gue that such a revision to the IRS’s enforcement powers would be premature 
at best, and superfluous at worst, in light of the new ACA requirements.206 
They may claim that the proposed intermediate sanctions model and the ACA 
requirements are designed to achieve the same purpose.207 Because the ACA 
requirements are still being implemented, a case could be made that Congress 
should hold off on passing new legislation directed at tax-exempt hospitals 
until they are fully evaluated.208 
 Upon further reflection, however, the ACA’s relevant provisions readily 
address this challenge.209 The ACA merely adds new conditions that tax-
exempt hospitals must satisfy besides the community benefits standard.210 Alt-
hough the new requirements are a step in the right direction, they do not go far 
enough to solve the problems associated with enforcement of the hospital tax 
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exemption.211 With the exception of a $50,000 excise tax imposed on hospitals 
that fail to complete a community health needs assessment, the IRS is still left 
with only two enforcement choices: do nothing or revoke a hospital’s exemp-
tion.212 Imposing more specific prohibitions on certain practices without simul-
taneously enhancing the enforcement powers of the IRS is unlikely to affect 
hospital behavior.213 
Although the ACA places additional obligations on tax-exempt hospitals, 
this Note’s proposed intermediate sanctions model will serve to increase hospi-
tals’ accountability to keep up their end of the exemption bargain.214 For ex-
ample, the ACA limits the rates that tax-exempt hospitals may bill to persons 
who are eligible for financial assistance and places restrictions on hospitals’ 
collection practices.215 These provisions are designed to address reports of 
egregious tax-exempt hospital behavior, including the practice of charging in-
digent patients higher rates than insured patients and using aggressive collec-
tion techniques without evaluating a patient’s financial constraints.216 
Nevertheless, hospitals are unlikely to take the new legislation serious-
ly.217 Many hospitals have already turned over control of Section 501(r) com-
pliance to their marketing departments.218 Others view the new reporting re-
quirements “simply as a new hoop to jump through with the least possible ef-
fort expended.”219 Presently, the IRS is reluctant to take enforcement action 
against tax-exempt hospitals that engage in such conspicuous practices because 
revocation is a drastic step, and the hospitals may otherwise be meeting the 
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community benefits standard.220 Accordingly, expanding the requirements for 
tax-exempt hospitals does not confront this problematic dynamic.221 
Furthermore, the new requirements are unlikely to delineate a line be-
tween the expected behavior of tax-exempt hospitals and their for-profit equiv-
alents.222 The ACA requires tax-exempt hospitals to conduct a community 
health needs assessment and develop written financial assistance and emergen-
cy care policies.223 Yet, the legislation does not establish any specific eligibility 
criteria for financial assistance or mandate a minimum level of coverage.224 
Thus, tax-exempt hospitals do not necessarily have to change their financial 
assistance or emergency care policies to comply with this provision; rather, all 
they must do is write it down and distribute it to patients.225 Although the 
ACA’s provisions are a step in the right direction, layering on new require-
ments alone will not be sufficient to influence tax-exempt hospitals to change 
their behavior.226  
An additional anticipated challenge to the intermediate sanctions model is 
that its use could trigger complex valuation issues.227 This, however, will not 
be an issue here.228 This is because the $50,000 excise tax on discrete behavior 
can be straightforwardly applied.229 The twenty-five percent tax on hospitals 
that fail to change their behavior, however, requires two estimates: the hospi-
tal’s hypothetical income tax obligation and the value of its community bene-
fits activities.230 These amounts arguably could be difficult to assess.231 There 
are many possible valuation methods and the IRS would require extensive in-
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formation about hospitals’ operating expenses and community benefits practic-
es to complete the valuation process.232  
The intermediate sanctions model that this Note proposes addresses the 
valuation problem in two ways.233 First, the additional tax is designed for the 
uncommon circumstance of a hospital failing to change its behavior after a 
$50,000 tax is levied upon it.234 Thus, valuation concerns would only be an 
issue on the rare occasions when the IRS might seek to impose the additional 
twenty-five percent tax.235 Second, hospitals are already required to annually 
report the estimated costs of their community benefits activities to the IRS.236 
Thus, the IRS is already in possession of all the information it would need to 
calculate the twenty-five percent tax.237 Moreover, Section 4958 intermediate 
sanctions for excess benefit transactions have been very valuable to the IRS 
when utilized properly.238 
The community benefits standard is often blamed for creating a system 
where tax-exempt hospitals reap extensive economic benefits without sharing 
such benefits with their communities.239 In fact, the absence of a flexible IRS 
enforcement mechanism is the culprit.240 To address this systemic issue, Con-
gress should adopt this Note’s proposed intermediate sanctions model, which 
would allow the IRS to better regulate tax-exempt hospitals’ activities.241 The 
model proposed herein goes beyond the ACA’s requirements because it targets 
specific undesirable practices and gives the IRS the proper tools to eradicate 
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such behavior.242 Although the IRS may encounter some valuation difficulties 
when assessing intermediate sanctions, it can overcome them by utilizing the 
reported hospital data that it already possesses.243 
CONCLUSION 
Tax-exempt hospitals receive millions of dollars worth of tax breaks each 
year, yet many of them act less than charitably. The IRS regulates the standard 
that hospitals must meet in order to qualify for a tax exemption. When a tax-
exempt hospital fails to live up to its charitable requirements, the IRS has two 
options: (1) do nothing; or (2) move to revoke the hospital’s tax-exempt status. 
Revocation is a drastic option that cannot be particularized to a hospital’s spe-
cific shortcomings, and as a result, the IRS rarely takes enforcement action 
against hospitals that fail to meet the community benefits standard. Commenta-
tors have suggested modifying the qualifying standard for tax-exempt hospitals 
to address this problem. Alternatively, Congress should give the IRS statutory 
authority to impose excise tax intermediate sanctions on underperforming hos-
pitals as an enforcement tool short of revocation. Intermediate sanctions would 
provide the IRS with flexibility to regulate the boundaries of tax-exempt status 
and ensure that communities continue to benefit from the services of tax-
exempt hospitals. Although more time is needed to realize the impact of the 
Affordable Care Act—which imposes additional requirements—on tax-exempt 
hospital behavior, one thing is certain: uncharitable hospitals are not and can 
never be “charitable” organizations.  
RACHEL WEISBLATT
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